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Abstract 
 
Habsburg Austria is a unique case for the study of “state-making:” the 
creation of means by which a sovereign state asserts its ability to 
control its territory. Examples of state-making include the creation of a 
professional army and the means with which to pay for it, or the defense 
of state borders. This thesis examines two periods in Austrian history for 
evidence of how the Habsburg Austrian state succeeded or failed in this 
process. The first period centers on the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) 
which challenged the very existence of the state and which resulted in 
the establishment of Europe’s first professional standing army by the 
end of the war. The second period also features a challenge to the 
state’s existence. However, in this case, the Habsburgs were 
constrained by a variety of domestic and economic factors, which 
amplified their international challenges. Ultimately, their failure to engage 
in effective state-making combined with their desperate need to 
preserve their great-power status resulted in a decision for a war that 
would ultimately destroy the state.
 1 
Chapter 1: State-Making in the Salzburger Saalachtal 
 
This thesis actually began some years ago, on a solitary hike in the 
Austrian village of Unken, as the author walked past the “Kalte Quelle” and 
towards the “Festung Kniepaß,” a small fortress overlooking the ancient 
road that runs deep into Salzburg’s Pinzgau. Partially due to its position 
about 20 meters above the road, partially due to its small size, and partially 
due to the wear of time, someone driving below the ridge it sits atop would 
hardly notice it. But those able to take a moment and examine the site will 
find a plaque, commemorating its erection in 1613 under Prince-
Archbishop Markus Sittikus. In the years to come, this fortress and 
Unken’s Landvolk militia who guarded it would play a critical role in 
Salzburg’s efforts to remain unsnarled with the brutal fighting of the Thirty 
Years War and were charged with expanding it considerably during the 
1630s to defend against a potential Swedish invasion.1 However, this 
fortress served a larger purpose: it was an effort by the Prince-Archbishops 
who ruled Salzburg to delineate and defend their territory as a sovereign 
and autonomous part of the Holy Roman Empire, and to consolidate the 
means of effective force over this territory. The Festung Kniepaß was a 
                                               
1 Friederike Zaisberger and Walter Schlegel, Burgen und Schlösser in Salzburg: Pinzgau, 
Pongau, Lungau (Vienna: Birken-Verlag, 1978), pp. 143-145. 
 2 
statement of sovereign authority, it was an act of state-making.  
 Modern Austria is full of tokens of the state-making process like 
Kniepaß, another example being the Theresianum Military Academy’s large 
stone relief adorned with the letters “AEIOU” “Alles Erdreich ist Österreich 
untertan” or “All the world is subject to Austria,” the motto chosen by the 
Holy Roman Emperor Friedrich III (1415-1493, HRE 1452-1493).2 Many of 
the officers and generals who contributed to the achievement (or failure) of 
Austria’s political and military goals, from the victories of the Napoleonic 
Wars to the destruction and defeat of World War I, spent their formative 
years training on the grounds of the Theresianum: their stories and failures 
are well known to students of European history. The Theresianum is 
significant for the history of Austrian state-making, as its establishment was 
another step in the creation of a professional standing army.3  
The construction of the fortress in Unken or the opening of the 
Theresianum in Wiener Neustadt were both acts of state-making: the 
interlocking historical processes through which sovereign rulers 
established the institutions, practices, and norms that allowed them to 
assert their claim to rule over the territory they controlled. State-making 
                                               
2 Autorenkollektiv, "A. E. I. O. U.," in Meyers Konversationslexikon (Vienna: Verlag des 
Bibliographischen Instituts, 1885), p. 1. 
3 At various points in this work, Austria, Habsburg Austria, Habsburg Central Europe, and 
Austria-Hungary are used to refer to the same political unit, which was centered on Vienna 
and ruled by a member of the Habsburg family. 
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was a process of capacity building, for example, the creation of a capable 
and professional army, relatively efficient means to collect taxes, and, as in 
Unken, the construction of fortresses from which agents of the sovereign 
might assert their claim to hold monopoly of legitimate force---their right to 
use violence to defend the state. 4 A sovereign power can be generally 
defined as a political body that controls a well-defined space, is relatively 
centralized, and which differentiates itself from other bodies or corporate 
structures (e.g. the Catholic Church or a tribal group).5 Sovereignty is a 
result of state-making: a strong state is able to enforce its claims to a 
monopoly of violence and overcome challenges to its authority.  
This thesis seeks to demonstrate how state-making was attempted 
within Habsburg Austria. The first case takes place during the Thirty Years 
War as Protestant invasion and revolt was a profound threat to the state’s 
ongoing existence. The second case examines how Habsburg Austria-
Hungary functioned as a confederation between an industrializing western 
half and a backward eastern half, and did so in an international context that 
became gradually more unfavorable to their continued survival.  
                                               
4 Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in The Formation of 
National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1975), p. 27. 
5 Tilly, “Reflection on the History of European State-Making,” pp. 28-29. 
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Habsburg Austria is a peculiar case for the study of state-making 
because it is often claimed to have not achieved the full “promise” of a state 
as France or Britain are claimed to have done. For example, in his 
introductory chapter to The Formation of National States in Western 
Europe, Charles Tilly refers to Habsburg Austria as a “rickety federation” 
that remained “weakly subordinated to the imperial center.”6 This view is 
largely correct, but it misses a more important point: the Habsburgs were 
able to engage in the process of state-making, they made an effort to create 
a functionally unified political entity just as France or Britain did, even if the 
Habsburgs were ultimately less successful. 
The Habsburgs did this in a context that was less conducive to the 
process than in Britain or France and which masks the nature of their 
efforts, leading to Habsburg Austria’s exclusion from the scholarly literature. 
Charles Tilly’s depiction of Habsburg Austria as a ramshackle confederation 
is correct for a time, but not for the whole period after 1648 as he seems to 
suggest. A more recent and prominent example is the work of Daron 
Acemoglu and James Robinson. Their analysis of the political incentives 
affecting the development or underdevelopment of European states in the 
nineteenth century fails to account for the division of Habsburg territories 
                                               
6 Tilly, “Reflection on the History of European State-Making,” pp. 13 and 27. 
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between the Austrian government in Vienna and the Hungarian government 
in Budapest.7 In their telling, it makes no difference that serfdom was 
eliminated in the lands ruled by Vienna in 1781 but only in 1848-1849 in 
those lands ruled from Budapest. They ignore the fact that the end of 
serfdom encouraged industrialization in Austria, which began after the end 
of the Napoleonic Wars and the wars accompanying need for the labor 
which might otherwise work in new factories and workshops. Economic 
development and industrialization are important, as a competitive economy 
provided the funds necessary for state-making. In the case of Austria-
Hungary, state-making was hindered by the positive decisions of Hungarian 
nobles that delayed industrialization in the Hungarian lands, as 
industrialization and development was well underway in the Austrian half. 
This thesis seeks to correct this inaccurate, caricatured view of 
development and state-making in Habsburg Austria, which is often found in 
work by non-subject specialists like Acemoglu and Robinson or those who 
romanticize Hungarian culture and politics like Alan Sked.8 
                                               
7 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, "Economic Backwardness in Political 
Perspective," American Political Science Review 100, no. 1 (2006). 
8 This matter will be taken up later, but see generally: Alan Sked, The Decline and Fall of 
the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001), Acemoglu and 
Robinson, "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," and Acemoglu and 
Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. (New York: 
Crown Business, 2012), pp. 222-230. 
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Where Austria-Hungary succeeded and where it failed is an 
interesting and under-explored question. This thesis seeks to partially 
correct this oversight through an examination of how the state-making 
process succeeded and failed in two case studies. The first case study 
examines Austria’s response to the revolt of Czech nobles who sought 
independence from Habsburg rule in order to establish a Protestant 
kingdom that would also preserve the feudal rights and prerogatives they 
felt were threatened by Habsburg centralization. This revolt was a 
fundamental challenge to Habsburg claims to rule and would require them 
to centralize and engage in acts of state-making. Over the course of the 
war, the Habsburgs would establish a professional army, develop means of 
efficient tax collection, and lay the foundation of a professional bureaucracy. 
Challenged to innovate and build a state or suffer defeat and likely the end 
of their rule in Central Europe, Habsburg Austria chose the former during 
the Thirty Years War.  
The second case is the failure of Austria-Hungary after 1867 to 
continue to build a state in the nineteenth century and how that failure 
played out on the domestic, economic, and international levels. This failure 
took many forms, for example, the bifurcated nature of the post-1867 state 
acted to push the two halves of the state apart, instead of allowing them to 
develop and work in unison. Economically, they were anything but unified, 
 7 
as Austria’s industrializing economy required different policies than those of 
the backward agrarian Hungarian half. Failures on the domestic and 
economic levels made Austria less able to compete on the international 
level, for example protectionist trade policy cost Austria-Hungary numerous 
allies in the Balkans, as its borders effectively closed to their grain and 
animal exports. Combined with changes to the system of norms that 
ensured Austria-Hungary’s recognition as a great power amongst other 
great powers, it was largely isolated and appeared to be have little other 
choice than to declare war in 1914. The failure to construct a state capable 
of meeting challenges on the domestic, economic, and international levels, 
or even to do as it had done three centuries prior.  
Habsburg Austria was never able to achieve the promise of a state, it 
was never able to administer its territories uniformly or establish a common 
patriotism. However, it did engage in the process of state-making, 
sometimes accidentally, sometimes with gusto, and sometimes half-
heartedly. Its successes and failures are nevertheless illuminating and offer 
the chance to see a new perspective on state-making, that of Austria-
Hungary’s failure.   
 8 
Chapter 2 
State-Making in Early Modern Habsburg Central Europe,  
1618 to 1648 
 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to explain how the events of the Thirty Years War from 
1618 to 1648 began to spur political development within the lands 
governed by the Austrian Habsburg monarchy. The outbreak of this war 
constituted a fundamental challenge to the Habsburgs ability to rule, as 
their rule had previously been dependent on the general support of a class 
of landholding elites with divergent interests from their own. The 
breakdown of previous conceptions of the relationship between governed 
and governor incentivized the development of new means with which 
monarchs might exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and 
coercion within the territories they claimed to rule. 
 Prior to the Protestant Reformation in 1517, Europe had generally 
conceived of relations between rulers as being subordinated to the 
overarching authority of the Pope and the Catholic Church under the name 
of Christendom: the idea of Europe as a spiritually united political, 
economic, and social whole, with its underlying consequences for the 
relations between rulers. Christendom formed a “normative community” 
that spoke a common language (Latin), that confessed a common faith, 
 9 
and that recognized a single individual, the Bishop of Rome, as its 
supreme spiritual authority. Within Christendom, power relations were 
strictly hierarchical, with the Pope’s authority superior to all other forms of 
power.9 Within individual kingdoms, this hierarchy extended to 
relationships between local kings and their subordinate nobles, and 
regulated the basis of their relationship. On the one hand, the subordinate 
lords owed kings fealty, paid the king taxes, and were in most cases 
required to perform a certain amount of military service per year. On the 
other, their kings had limited scope of action, for example their powers to 
unilaterally raise taxes and spend were checked by noble estates which 
had to approve increased taxation. Individual polities were generally weak, 
but the fact that no single authority could monopolize control was likely 
encouraged the acceptance of a broader conception of Christendom as a 
unifying principal.10  
 The coming of the Protestant Reformation in 1517 divided Europe 
into competing Catholic and Protestant halves and in so doing destroyed 
any chance of reunifying Europe or recreating the idea of Europe as a 
unified Christian space. This had profound consequences for the norms 
                                               
9 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), vol. 1, p. 420. 
10 Ibid., p. 412. 
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and practices that regulated relations between rulers, as it was at its heart 
a spiritual conception of power in which the “supra-territorial, cross-ethnic 
organizations of the Catholic Church” bound the system together.11  
 The conflicts that resulted from the collapse of Christendom and 
which culminated in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) all challenged rulers 
to defend their claims to lordship in ways that went beyond traditional 
claims of religious legitimacy. Instead, the war challenged them to build 
professional armies, create stable and reliable mechanisms for funding 
those armies, and break the power of entrenched noble elites. In sum, it 
encouraged them to build effective states.12  
 States are political units with relatively fixed borders, governed 
through durable and impersonal institutions that exercise their authority in 
a regular and generally standardized fashion.13 States draw borders to 
delineate the territory they control and generally assert the exclusive right 
to use coercive force within these borders. They create standardized, 
professional armies with which they might assert this right and maintain 
their control over their borders. The process of state-making is the 
                                               
11 Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible 
Paradigm for Research on Variations Within Europe," in The Formation of National States 
in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), e.g. p. 
575 and Mann, Sources of Social Power, vol. I, p. 412.  
12 Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," pp. 26-28 and Mann, 
Sources of Social Power, vol. I, pp. 475-490. 
13 Tilly, ibid. 
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development of the state’s ability to assert its the monopoly of violence, 
the creation of a standing army, and the means with which they might pay 
for it all: a system of efficient tax collection. Perhaps most importantly in 
contrast to Christendom, a state’s claim to temporal authority stood above 
and outside the Catholic Church’s claim to hold spiritual and temporal 
authority.14      
 In the case of Habsburg Austria, the process of state-making was 
haphazard and often seemed to depend on sheer luck alone. What is 
important for purpose of this chapter is to understand where they 
succeeded in building a state and how the Thirty Years War challenged 
them to do so. 
 The beginning of the Thirty Years War was a revolt by Protestant 
nobles who sought to defend their medieval rights and privileges against 
possible centralization by the Catholic Habsburgs. In offering the crown to 
a Protestant German speaking monarch, Christian V, they also asserted 
their right to act as veto players over any and all actions by the king, in 
effect rendering their new ruler unable to administer his new kingdom. 
Their actions left this newly independent kingdom unable to survive for 
                                               
14 Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), p. 10 and Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European 
State Making," in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 27. 
 12 
long: there was no means for organizing an effective army nor any way to 
effectively raise revenue to pay for it. For these reasons, it should come as 
no surprise that Bohemia and Moravia were reconquered within a year of 
Christians coronation. The revolt and subsequent war were a challenge 
which could be overcome through state-making. In Habsburg Austria, the 
challenge posed to the right of Habsburg monarchs to rule was overcome 
through the creation of a professional standing army and a regular system 
of taxation that provided revenue to fund that army.15  
 This chapter begins with a discussion of the nature of Christendom 
and the development of sovereignty as an idea for organizing political life 
within Europe. It then considers the origins of the Thirty Years War as a 
struggle for competing conceptions of political organization within Austria. 
Finally, it demonstrates how the Thirty Years War challenged the 
Habsburgs authority and encouraged the Habsburgs to engage in state-
making in order to overcome the grave challenges the war posed to their 
authority.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
15 Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," pp. 26-28 and Mann, 
Sources of Social Power, vol. 1, pp. 475-490. 
 13 
Christendom, Modernization, and State-Making 
To understand how state-making played out within Austria, our starting 
point must be some conception of the organization of political life at the 
beginning of the “modern” period: the idea of Christendom. But what was 
Christendom? Generally, it stood for the united community of (Western) 
Christians, held together by their common faith in the tenets of Christianity, 
as interpreted by the Catholic Church.16 Christendom united the 
Scandinavia with Spain and Scotland with Sicily. In sum, it was the 
universal commonwealth of believers, under the authority of the Pope as 
the leader of the Church.17  
 The proselytization and integration of non-Christian tribes across 
Europe in the centuries following the collapse of the Western Roman 
Empire are primarily responsible for the development of Christendom as a 
particular political and ideological community. Proselytization led to the 
creation of a rural noble elite who could maintain a semblance of order 
within the newly converted spaces, and created a layer of new rulers who 
were subject to the authority of both their immediate superior, for example 
                                               
16 See, e.g., Mark Greengrass, Christendom Destroyed: Europe 1517-1648 (London: 
Penguin, 2014), pp. 12-14. 
17 The Pope’s actual authority during this period and every period, must be considerably 
qualified, as papal power was constantly contested and contingent. See, e.g.: John W. 
O’Malley, A History of the Popes: From Peter to the Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2009). 
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the Holy Roman Emperor, but also the Pope as the pinnacle of power 
within Christendom. This political structure put the Church at the center of 
social life and made Christianity the primary source of social identity.18 In 
addition to its social role, the Church built itself into a political and 
economic juggernaut through a network of parishes, monasteries and their 
dependent lay personnel, and vast land holdings with their accompanying 
rents. One can view the significance of these holdings as attempts to 
maximize control and dominate the peasantry, or as an attempt to create 
order where none previously existed.19 In either case, that the Church 
exercised control to this degree and that its property and other temporal 
rights were respected, reinforced the existence of Christendom and the 
Church’s dominance thereof as a political, social, and economic fact. 
Nevertheless, no single authority, neither the Church nor local rulers, were 
able to monopolize authority over an extended period, instead 
Christendom was diffused multiple sources of authority.  
                                               
18 Mann, Sources of Social Power, vol. I, pp. 335-338.  
19 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French 
Revolution (London: Profile Books, 2012), pp. 264-268. In this sense, Fukuyama hints at 
his view of nation-states (“Denmark”) as the Hegelian end-point of political development, 
see the section on modernization theory below. Hedley Bull demonstrates the problem 
with a view like Fukuyama’s in that Mediaeval Christendom failed to create actual order 
and was, in fact, a quite violent and probably unpleasant place. See: Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 
pp. 245-246. 
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 The Protestant Reformation was a fundamental challenge to the 
existence of this system, as Protestantism objected to the union of spiritual 
authority with temporal power. One of Martin Luther’s primary objectives 
was to develop a system where the two spheres were fundamentally 
separate so as to prevent secular interference in religious practices.20 The 
role of a church was of a free congregation or community (German: 
Gemeinde) in which the faithful were prepared for salvation and protected 
from the temptations of the secular material world. The role of a ruler was 
to ensure order, by which he meant that property rights would be 
respected and social honor would be upheld. Therefore, truly faithful 
Christians could only subject themselves to the authority of rulers who 
respected these boundaries, no matter how fuzzy the boundary between 
the two became.21 
                                               
20 Martin Luther, "Von weltlicher Obrigkeit, wie weit man ihr Gehorsam schuldig sei," in Dr 
Martin Luthers Werke (Weimar: Böhlau, 1900), Weimarer Ausgabe vol. 11, pp. 250-252. 
See also: Søren Kierkegaard. Practice in Christianity. Translated by Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong. Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 20. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991, p. 68. 
21 Ibid., p. 265. Luther is referring in this section to Romans 13 (NASB) “Every person is to 
be in subjection to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, 
and those which exist are established by God...” On the fuzziness of this boundary see: 
Benjamin J. Kaplan, Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in 
Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 17-18, and 
Mann, Sources of Social Power, vol. I, p. 467, see also: Alexandra Walsham, "Migrations 
of the Holy: Explaining Religious Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe," Journal 
of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 44, no. 2 (2014). 
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 If Christendom provided a basis for relations between rulers on 
religious terms, the schism of western Christianity demanded that relations 
between rulers be recast on non-religious terms. A first step in this 
direction was taken in the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, which established the 
principal Cuius regio, eius religio (whose land, his religion) of a ruler to 
determine whether their land would be Protestant or Catholic. In effect, this 
established a precedent of non-intervention by outside actors on the basis 
of religion.22 From this point, we can see how this would evolve into a more 
general principal that a ruler is “master at home, and an equal to other 
such rulers abroad,” as James Sheehan defines sovereignty, and the 
decline of a religion as a motivating factor for war.23 Religion could no 
longer make a “cosmic” claim, that a heresy in France or Bohemia was 
sufficient grounds to invade another ruler’s land, as it had, for example, 
during the Albigensian Crusade. And while it is not reasonable to claim that 
the Peace of Augsburg alone established the principal of sovereignty, it is 
reasonable to view it as the fundament of the broader notion of sovereignty 
as an ordering principal.  
  
 
                                               
22 Peter H. Wilson, "Dynasty, Constitution, and Confession: The Role of Religion in the 
Thirty Years War," The International History Review 30, no. 3 (2008) 
23 For the formulation, I am indebted to a lecture James Sheehan gave on the topic. See: 
James J. Sheehan, "The Problem of Sovereignty in European History," The American 
Historical Review 111, no. 1 (2006): p. 2. 
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 James Sheehan defines sovereignty as making two distinct claims: 
 
"Sovereignty assumes, first of all, that political power is distinct from other organizations 
in the community—religious, familial, economic. Second, sovereignty asserts that this 
public authority is preeminent and autonomous, that is, superior to institutions within the 
community and independent from those outside. In theory, the sovereign can be no one’s 
vassal: at home, sovereigns are masters; abroad, they are the equals of other 
sovereigns.”24 
 
Therefore, a sovereign state is one that exercises what Max Weber 
famously described as a “monopoly of legitimate force” within its 
established and acknowledged borders.25 But how does a state exercise 
this monopoly? Rulers sought to construct institutions that might ensure 
that their control, their monopoly of violence, reached every corner of their 
territory.26 This is the idea of state-making in action. 
 The term “state-making” first emerged as part of a broader scholarly 
dialogue within American social science in the years following World War II 
as scholars sought to find a universal and comparative basis for the 
development of states and state institutions. The goal was a theory that 
could not only explain development, but also one that could be 
operationalized to accelerate development in newly liberated or 
                                               
24 Ibid. 
25 See: Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78. 
26 Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Bringing the State 
Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
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decolonized territories. More importantly for the policymakers who these 
theorists of modernization theory sought to influence (and obtain research 
grants from), this development process was meant to help create 
institutions and political practices that would draw these countries in to the 
US sphere of influence during the Cold War.27 
 A state is a political unit that exists over an extended period, within 
defined, relatively permanent borders, and where a central authority can 
legitimately claim to hold a monopoly over the use of violence as a means 
of coercion. In an ideal-type state, the central ruler’s authority is distinct 
from and superior to all other forms of power. State-making, therefore, 
involves the development of institutions with which the characteristics 
might be created and defended. A standing professional army is generally 
needed to defend the borders of the state and, possibly in conjunction with 
police forces, is needed to defend and assert the state’s monopoly of 
violence, while impersonal and durable administrative institutions can 
reach the far corners of the state to carry out the directives of the 
sovereign. These state functions are supported by resource extraction 
mechanisms: systems of tax collection that go beyond tax farming and 
instead depend upon professional bureaucrats collecting regularized 
                                               
27 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), pp. 198-202. 
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amounts of taxes. Finally, and perhaps most importantly to distinguish a 
sovereign state from other forms of power, the power of the sovereign is 
superior to other forms of authority. This is a critical distinction, as it 
separates a sovereign state from a political unit operating within the 
framework of Christendom. In Christendom, there was no single superior 
authority, but instead a collection of diffuse authorities. An ideal type state 
is ostensibly superior to other forms of authority.28  
 The question of whether a state is a state is not a binary one. 
Instead, theories of state-making assert that the process of becoming a 
state is dependent on the basis of the acquisition of state characteristics. 
The previous paragraph made reference to an “ideal-type” state, but it 
seems unlikely that any particular state during the early modern period 
could claim absolutely to have achieved these characteristics. 
 State-making can occur as the result of numerous catalysts, in the 
                                               
28 I specifically refer to ideal types, because this can be qualified to the point of 
meaninglessness. For an example of where states placed sovereign temporal power over 
spiritual claims to authority, consider Henry VIII’s abolition and sale of monasteries or the 
establishment of the monarch as the head of the Church in England under Elizabeth. On 
this question, see: Jerry F. Hough and Robin Grier, The Long Process of Development: 
Building Markets and States in Pre-industrial England, Spain and their Colonies (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 144-149. This definition of states and state-
making is synthesized from Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," 
Mann, Sources of Social Power, vol. I, pp. 373-500, Thomas Ertman, Birth of the 
Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), especially pp. 6-34, and Youssef Cohen, Brian R. 
Brown, and A. F. K. Organski, "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent 
Creation of Order," The American Political Science Review 75, no. 4 (1981). 
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example of Austria, the need to defend the sovereign ruler’s claim to be the 
supreme authority in the lands he ruled. The Habsburg family’s Central 
European crowns were often attained as the result of strategic marriages 
or other patrimonial arrangements, and not through conquest or other 
coercive means. They generally had less incentive to develop a 
professional standing army and could rely on irregular militias made up of 
peasants fulfilling yearly military service obligations. Contrast this with the 
later case of Prussia-Brandenburg, where dynastic survival was closely 
linked with the ability to fend off numerous aggressive neighbors with 
superior resource bases and more fertile soil. In the case of Austria, ad-hoc 
militias and feudal service obligations generally proved sufficient until the 
Thirty Years War.29 
 
State-Making in War and Crisis 
How can we generally understand the meaning of the Thirty Years War and 
its importance for the state-making process? The war from 1618 to 1648 
was neither an exclusively religious conflict, nor can it be masked as a 
subsidiary of a larger “General Crisis” in which all aspects of human 
existence were threatened by a transformation in economic, environmental, 
                                               
29 Frank Tallett, War and Society in Early Modern Europe, 1495-1715 (New York: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 193-198. 
 
 21 
political, and social practices.30 Instead, the war was part of a broader 
conflict between conflicting views of the relationship between state and 
society and between states themselves. After the Reformation eliminated 
the foundation of the previous set of relationships, a new basis upon which 
order might be established became necessary. This new system of 
relationships between states required that that rulers be able to assert and 
defend their claims to sovereignty over the areas they ruled and maintain 
the means for doing so. To this end, we must recognize the Thirty Years 
War as a political and religious war that challenged rulers to respond in 
defense of their sovereign claims through the creation of institutions that 
allowed them to do so. This took on a special meaning for the Habsburg 
lands, as what became the Thirty Years War was more than a conflict 
between the Catholic Habsburgs and Protestant Czech Nobles, but a war 
between two conceptions of political organization. The war helped make a 
proto-Austrian state, as it spurred the creation of military and fiscal 
                                               
30 On conflicting theories of the Thirty Years War, see: Cornel Zwierlein, "The Thirty Years’ 
War – A Religious War? Religion and Machiavellism at the Turning Point of 1635," in The 
Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years' War (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 
241-242; Peter H. Wilson, "The Causes of the Thirty Years War 1618-1648," The English 
Historical Review 123, no. 502 (2008); and Peter H. Wilson, "Dynasty, Constitution, and 
Confession: The Role of Religion in the Thirty Years War,” The International History Review 
30, no. 3 (2008). For criticism of the General Crisis theory and of the exclusively religious 
theory, see: Niels Steensgaard, "The Seventeenth-Century Crisis," in The General Crisis of 
the Seventeenth Century, ed. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith (Second ed. New York: 
Routledge, 1997), pp. 36-39. 
 22 
institutions and practices that subverted medieval conceptions of state 
and society and created the means by which a ruler in Vienna would be 
able to assert their authority across vast distances and challenging terrain.  
 Prior to 1618, rulers across Europe were bound by both normative 
traditions and practical institutional constraints that limited their ability to 
assert authority without the support of local lords and other members of a 
ruler’s court, in a sense, these local lords constituted “veto-players” who 
were able to individually withhold their consent, thus denying the central 
ruler the use of the forces pledged to them (of whatever kind, a local 
peasant militia, knights or otherwise).31 There were either limited or no 
extant mechanisms through which a central ruler could exercise an 
independent claim to sovereign power.  
 In the century leading to the Thirty Years War, the Austrian Habsburgs 
came under enormous financial stress that strengthened the power of 
these local lords. In the east, the Habsburgs were challenged by the rapid 
expansion of Ottoman Turkish power which reached its peak with the 1529 
Siege of Vienna and subsequent wars through 1606 that required 
                                               
31 On the understanding of local lords as “veto-players” see: Mauricio Drelichman and 
Hans-Joachim Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell: Debt, Taxes, and Default in the 
Age of Philip II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 276. 
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expensive and largely ad hoc mercenary armies.32 At the same time, tax 
collection by the Habsburg monarch was based largely on the irregular 
payment of limited fixed amounts, not a percentage of a given estates 
income. Rising agricultural prices meant that the incomes of these estates 
rose moderately, while the income of the Habsburg rulers in Vienna were 
strained by the expenses of the Turkish wars and inflation that ate away the 
purchasing power of the taxes they levied. The result was a heavily 
indebted Habsburg monarch in Vienna with no power to raise revenue.33 
Simultaneously, within the Habsburg lands, Protestant nobles grew 
increasingly frustrated, as Catholics were promoted to higher ranks of the 
nobility. Surprisingly, the reason for filling these positions with Catholics 
was not the fact that they were Catholic (though that constituted a 
secondary justification) but that the codification of Roman law and legal 
practices into a modernized civil and criminal law code in the Habsburg 
territories demanded experts in Roman law, most of whom were Catholic.34 
This resulted in the increasing polarization of nobles along confessional 
                                               
32 Karin J. MacHardy, "The Rise of Absolutism and Noble Rebellion in Early Modern 
Habsburg Austria, 1570 to 1620," Comparative Studies in Society and History 34, no. 3 
(1992) and Wilson, "The Causes of the Thirty Years War 1618-1648.” 
33 Jan de Vries, "The Economic Crisis of the Seventeenth Century after Fifty Years," 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 40, no. 2 (2009): pp. 170-171 and Steensgaard, "The 
Seventeenth-Century Crisis," pp. 44-49. 
34 Charles Phineas Sherman, Roman Law in the Modern World, vol. 1 (New Haven: New 
Haven Law Book Company, 1922), pp. 222-224 
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lines, but in response to a secular political problem. By the 1610s, 
Protestant nobles within the Habsburg lands sought to “internationalize” 
their frustration, attempting to involve other rulers in Habsburg domestic 
affairs, a fundamental threat to the sovereignty of the state.35  
 In this context, the so-called Defenestration of Prague represents the 
Protestant abandonment of legal means to secure medieval privileges 
against efforts by the Habsburg monarch to standardize the administration 
of the territories they govern against Protestant lords’ efforts to ensure 
decentralized and weak administration in the interest of their own rural 
estates. For this reason, defeating Protestant nobles and consolidating 
state power give the Thirty Years War its special designation as a war for 
state-making and accordingly an especially high degree of bellicosity: it 
was a war not between states, but between the idea of a state and a 
medieval conception of decentralized authority.36  
 The 1618 Bohemian Protestant rebellion lead to the creation of a 
short-lived polity that demonstrated their failure to respond to the new 
                                               
35 MacHardy, "The Rise of Absolutism and Noble Rebellion in Early Modern Habsburg 
Austria, 1570 to 1620," p. 424-427, and Henry Fredrick Schwarz, The Imperial Privy 
Council in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), pp. 66-
75. 
36 Johannes Burkhardt, "Die Friedlosigkeit der frühen Neuzeit: Grundlegung einer Theorie 
der Bellizität," Zeitscrhift für Historische Forschung 24, no. 4 (1997) and "The Thirty Years’ 
War," in A Companion to the Reformation World, ed. R. Po-Chia Hsia (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2008), pp. 277-281. 
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world of centralizing state institutions. Their chosen ruler, Friedrich V of 
Rhein-Pfalz, was selected partially for his relationships with the other 
Protestant rulers within Europe and his promise to indulge the privileges 
they had lost under the Habsburgs.37 Again, however, we see the clash of 
weak state institutions against medieval political practice: the Habsburgs 
were able to raise an army, collect taxes, and exercise force effectively. In 
contrast, the Bohemian estates made only limited financial contributions to 
the war effort, Friedrich’s financial resources were conspicuously strained, 
and his supposed international connections failed to bring any significant 
level of support from other Protestant rulers.38 
 There are legitimate reasons to argue, as Burkhardt does, that the 
Czechs were the modernizing state-makers, seeking to exercise almost 
proto-democratic control over an absolutist king, similar to Simon de 
Montfort’s assertion of noble rights in thirteenth-century England. In doing 
so, however Burkhardt fails to recognize the fundamentally reactionary 
nature of the landed elites who sought to preserve a medieval order.39 
 The key question remains: how did the Austrian Habsburg monarchy 
                                               
37 Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: From Maximilian I to the Peace 
of Westphalia, 2 vols., vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 573-575 and 
Burkhardt, "The Thirty Years’ War," pp. 277-281. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Burkhardt, "The Thirty Years’ War," pp. 277-281, de Vries, "The Economic Crisis of the 
Seventeenth Century after Fifty Years," pp. 170-171, and Steensgaard, "The Seventeenth-
Century Crisis," pp. 45-49. 
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respond to the challenges posed by the Protestant revolt and the 
beginning of the Thirty Years War? And how does their response to these 
events constitute state-making? The organization of the Habsburg 
monarchy complicates any attempt to understand it as a unified whole, as 
it would never achieve the degree of centralization that a state like France 
did. Furthermore, the realms remained for the most part separate, they did 
not come close to forming a single body until the 1806 dissolution of the 
Holy Roman Empire and the creation of the quasi-unified Austrian Empire. 
However, none of this can change the fact that the Austrian response to 
the war of 1618-1648 constituted state-making in three significant ways: it 
broke the power of the entrenched noble estates, it created a relatively 
coherent military organization, and established a degree of fiscal 
organization not previously realized. 
 The Protestant revolt did not result in the reassertion of their power, 
but instead helped break the power of the estates as a force within both 
Austria and Bohemia.40 The Austrian and Bohemian territories maintained 
separate but mostly equal systems of noble estates that exercised 
representative powers within their territory.41 The rebellion that began in 
                                               
40 Robert Bireley, Ferdinand II, Counter-Reformation Emperor, 1578-1637 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 135-136. 
41 The Austrian lands in question being Lower Austria (Österreich unter der Enns) and 
Upper Austria (Österreich ob der Enns). 
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Prague destroyed the relative equality between the Protestant dominated 
estates (Bohemia and Upper Austria) and Catholic Lower Austria. The 
reason for this was the abandonment of a relationship built upon trust and 
adherence to expected norms of behavior on the part of the Bohemians 
and Upper Austrians. Once the initial rebellion within Bohemia had been 
quelled in the 1620s, Habsburg territories continued to be ruled separately, 
nor were their fundamental political rights withdrawn in favor of a baroque 
absolutism. However, turnover within the ranks of the nobility, for example 
because of emigration to Protestant kingdoms, resulted in estates that 
were overwhelmingly Catholic. However, the important roles held by the 
estates, for example as the mediators of relations between monarch and 
peasants, were largely maintained.42 Where other rulers, for example his 
immediate predecessor, might have sought to engage in the complete 
reordering of state-society relations, Ferdinand II refused to abandon 
longstanding legal and social practices. Ferdinand did not, for example, 
invoke his rights under the 1555 Peace of Augsburg to force the 
conversion of his Protestant subjects to Catholicism.43 Centralization and 
consolidation were achieved, the emperor had considerably more power to 
                                               
42 Michael Hochedlinger, Austria's Wars of Emergence: War, State and Society in the 
Habsburg Monarchy, 1683-1797 (New York: Longman, 2003), p. 29 and Bireley, Ferdinand 
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influence the actions of the estates, but in such a fashion that broadly 
respected the entrenched rights that Protestant nobles had feared losing in 
1618.44 Altogether, this resulted in a significantly more coordinated polity 
that spanned the Habsburg realms.  
 I have repeatedly argued that the keystone of state-making and 
sovereignty is the ability of a ruler to exercise a monopoly of violence 
within their realms. In addition to the possibility of localized rebellions as in 
Bohemia in 1618, the Habsburgs had dealt with multiple protracted Turkish 
wars from the 1520s to 1606, each one requiring the raising of a new army. 
This system primarily functioned through the estates of the constituent 
Habsburg territories, which were responsible for raising these armies and 
contributing to their upkeep.45 As the Czech and Upper Austrian estates 
were in revolt, this presented a serious problem. In addition to a military 
crisis, the Habsburgs had exhausted their financial resources and lacked 
the means through which they could raise additional resources.46  
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 The initial response to the uprising in Prague assumed that the 
existing system of military and financial organization through the territorial 
estates would be restored at a later date. Interim solutions to both the 
military and fiscal crises were found in an army raised by Habsburg allied 
Bavaria and generous subsidies by the wealthier Spanish Habsburgs to 
pay for mercenaries.47 Even after the defeat of the remaining Bohemian 
Protestant military opposition in 1623, little serious consideration appears 
to have been given to the possibility of further conflict.48 The entrance of a 
new Danish army to oppose the Habsburgs in 1625 again revealed the 
need for new thinking, as the Habsburgs again found themselves without 
the means to raise an army and to engage in another battle. 
 Lacking the means to finance an army, the Habsburg Emperor 
Ferdinand empowered to the wealthy and enterprising Catholic Bohemian 
nobleman Albrecht von Wallenstein to construct and direct an army on his 
behalf. Over the course of two years, Wallenstein was able to raise funds to 
pay and equip some 100,000 soldiers, through the use of private financing 
mechanisms he developed, the sale of confiscated lands, and forced 
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contributions from the towns they occupied.49 Furthermore, Wallenstein 
began to pioneer methods for mass producing uniforms, equipment, and 
other provisions, innovations that could not be matched by other 
contemporary forces.50 By 1633-1634, he began to ignore orders given to 
him by Ferdinand and his deputies, commanding a military machine that 
potentially threatened its ostensible masters. For this reason, Wallenstein 
was assassinated, but only after the loyalty of the army to the Emperor was 
ascertained.51 The result was a relatively stable, well equipped, and 
effectively disciplined military force, under the direct control of a state 
sovereign for the first time in Europe.52  
 Nevertheless, the need to support this new military establishment was 
still lacking. Initially, the estates of the realms were directed to coordinate 
the supply and pay of the troops garrisoned within their territory, which 
quickly proved to be haphazard and inefficient. A second attempt was 
made with the creation of a permanent obligation on the estates to provide 
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an ill-defined level of financial and material support to the army.53 
Ultimately, however, a solution was only found with the introduction of a 
formal military tax (“kontribution”) which was paid yearly to a newly created 
imperial office charged with the organization, management, and supply of 
the army, the Generalkriegskommissariat.54  
 A ruler’s need to enforce their monopoly of violence, to assert their 
claim to authority over the territory they claim as their own, led Habsburg 
monarchs in the seventeenth-century to reconsider the organization and 
use of their power. Faced with rebellion and near defeat, they asserted 
power in ways that were previously unthinkable, reorganizing the 
constitution of their lands and reducing the power of nobles, imposing 
standardized taxes on the regions to pay for an army, building an 
institution that could assert a ruler’s authority directly. In sum, the creation 
of a military and financial establishment that would endure in some form 
until 1918, forged in the midst of crisis and near defeat.  
                                               
53 Hochedlinger, "The Habsburg Monarchy: From 'Military-Fiscal State' to 'Militarization’," 
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Chapter 3 
State-Breakdown in Late Habsburg Austria-Hungary, 1867 to 1914 
 
„Kaiser Franz Josef ist die stärkste Bindung, die heute alle Nationen hier zusammenhält, 
und an ihn wendet sich das ganze Begeisterungsbedürfnis all dieser Völker, wendet sich 
statt an die Nation an eine Person und verwandelt sie in ihre Sache.“55  
Stefan Zweig, „Das Land ohne Patriotismus“ [The Country without Patriotism] 
     
The Body Without a Soul 
In 1909, the Austrian writer Stefan Zweig described Habsburg Austria as a 
country in which the individual parts all worked, but failed to work together. 
The heart beat, the lungs breathed, the muscles of the legs moved the 
body slowly forward. But that uniting principle—a soul—could not be 
found. The only thing that could hold the country together, according to 
Zweig, was the elderly heart of Emperor Franz Josef, who embodied the 
whole of the Austro-Hungarian state.56 Imperial bureaucrats, with their 
military style ranks and uniforms, tied the state together, just as they tied 
bundles of documents with gold and black strings, the colors that 
symbolized the thousand year old Monarchy.57 The coming years would 
                                               
55 Stefan Zweig, "Das Land ohne Patriotismus," in Die schlaflose Welt, ed. Knut Beck 
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56 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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serve to demonstrate just how frayed these strings had become, as 
Austria-Hungary collapsed under the weight of the First World War.  
The previous chapter discussed the ways in which the Habsburg 
monarchy had begun to construct institutions that allowed it to effectively 
exercise control throughout its territory in Central Europe. Faced with 
defeat in the Thirty Years War, Habsburg Monarchs were forced to 
respond in innovative ways that reshaped the relationship between the 
political regime they embodied and the society over which it governed. 
During the Thirty Years War, the Habsburgs had engaged in state-making: 
they had a relatively effective standing army and had created fiscal 
mechanisms with which to help pay for it, and they used that army and 
those institutions to fight their opponents to a stalemate in a destructive 
war of attrition. The decision to maintain that army (albeit at a reduced 
strength) after the war meant that the sovereign ruler possessed somewhat 
independent means through which to assert their right to rule.  
As has been previously noted, state-making generally is the process of 
developing the institutions and mechanisms that allow a state to maintain 
its territorial integrity, assert the monopoly of violence, and extract the 
resources that enable it to do so. The nineteenth century saw the rise of 
“modern” states that met those criteria and in addition featured 
streamlined legal codes, like the Napoleonic Code of 1804 or the 
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Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (General Civil Code) of 1811.58 They 
also featured high degrees of centralization and relatively developed 
industrial economies. Habsburg Austria broadly met these criteria, but the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire did not.59  
This chapter begins with the results of the 1867 Ausgleich constitution 
that formally divided the Empire into two halves at a moment of 
considerable weakness. After the devastating Habsburg Austrian defeat in 
1866 at the Battle of Königgrätz, Emperor Franz Josef sought to bind the 
empire together, lest the Hungarians seek independence or to replace him 
with another monarch.60 With an incredibly weak negotiating position 
resulting from the Austrian defeat at Königgrätz, he lacked the ability to 
create the centralizing, modern state that might have overcome the 
domestic, economic, and international challenges that the Empire faced in 
1867. Instead, the bifurcated and confederal nature of the Austro-
Hungarian state resulted in decentralized and fractious polities, policies 
                                               
58 The code itself was published as: Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch für die 
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that hindered industrialization and development, and an ever worsening 
position within the European concert which altogether prevented state-
making and instead resulted in state-breakdown.  
State-making in Habsburg Austria was a response to crises, in the 
previous chapter, the Thirty Years War being the best example. In the 
period between 1648 and 1867, that continued to be the case. The efforts 
of the “Enlightened Absolutists” in the intervening two centuries did not 
alter this pattern. Maria Theresia’s near defeat in the Wars of the 1740s 
was the event that spurred both her own and her son’s efforts at the 
creation of a truly unified and cohesive Habsburg Austrian state.61 It is 
impossible to know with certainty, but perhaps not unreasonable to 
imagine that Habsburg Austria might have vanished without that and other 
near-death experiences to drive state-making forward.62  
What makes the case of 1867-1914 different from previous cases 
where crises inspired state-making was that the logic of Austro-Hungarian 
governance had become fixed on the idea of holding the empire together 
at all costs, not building a stronger state in order to more effectively 
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exercise state power. Imagine for a minute the position of the Austro-
Hungarian Emperor in 1867: he had lost any claim to leadership within the 
German nation after the Battle of Königgrätz, as Hohenzollern Prussia 
established itself as the preeminent German power. Only seven years 
previously at the Battle of Solferino, he himself in command of his own 
army, he oversaw a defeat which lost the considerable wealth and prestige 
of Milan and Austrian Lombardy. These defeats were considered to have 
been severe blows to the prestige of the Habsburg Monarchy itself (“zur 
Ehre Meines Hauses,” “for the honor of my Imperial House”) and no doubt 
to Franz Josef personally.63 Given these circumstances, choosing a painful 
and ultimately disadvantageous political compromise with Hungary in 
order to hold the remaining kingdoms of Habsburg Central Europe 
together over the short to medium term appears reasonable. As the state-
making in Austria was contingent on a monarch using crisis to drive the 
process forward, the warped political logic of post-1867 Austria prevented 
this from happening. 
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York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 45-47. “zur Ehre…” see: Franz Josef I and Karl 
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The Ausgleich and Political Dysfunction 
During his 1890s tour through Europe, Mark Twain spent a year in 
Vienna, improving his German and circulating within the higher ranks of 
Viennese society. Thanks to his social connections, Twain obtained a 
coveted ticket to the Reichsrat public gallery, from which he observed the 
twelve-hour filibuster speech of German liberal Otto Lecher.64 Lecher’s 
opposition to a bill allowing for Czech to be used by Czech speakers in the 
course of conducting government business encapsulated Austria-
Hungary’s domestic political crisis. What should have been a relatively 
simple and uncontroversial reform became incredibly polarizing and a 
cause for riots across the German speaking Austrian territories, resulting in 
the use of the army and the suspension of “normal” political life until 1907. 
The problem was not only the absence of a common national idea, it was 
that the bifurcated structure of domestic politics exacerbated this absence 
by magnitudes, especially when combined with evermore polarized 
political elites who sought to outflank their opponents through ever more 
extreme positions. In the Hungarian half, these problems were frustrated 
by the additional goal of asserting Magyar ethnic superiority. 
                                               
64 Twain’s account is given in Mark Twain, "Stirring Times in Austria," in In Defense of 
Harriet Shelley and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1918 [1898]). Cf. the 
critique given in Max Lederer, "Mark Twain in Vienna," Mark Twain Quarterly 7, no. 1 
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It is hard to imagine a less happy or functional institutional arrangement 
than Austria-Hungary’s in 1867. From his ascent to the throne in the midst 
of revolution in 1848, Emperor Franz Josef had promulgated a series of 
constitutions aimed less at reforming and streamlining the functioning of 
the state and more at ensuring the stability and continuity of quasi-
absolutist government. At the same time, Austria engaged in a renewed 
struggle over the future of the German speaking lands as a whole, seeking 
to maintain the equilibrium that had existed since 1815, in opposition to 
the Prussian drive for hegemony over the non-Austrian lands.65 However, 
Austria’s crippling defeat during the 1866 Battle of Königgrätz effectively 
settled this question, as it revealed the deficiencies of Austro-Hungarian 
power.66 When confronted with superior force, the Habsburg Army did not 
stand to fight, but crumbled, hardly a cause to rally Hungarian peasants or 
Czech factory workers around.67 
Having lost both the small German states that were historical Habsburg 
allies and centuries of Habsburg claims to authority as leaders of the 
German nation, Franz Josef was forced to agree to whatever his Hungarian 
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nobles demanded, in order that they not fracture the entire Empire.68 What 
they received in the 1867 Ausgleich (Compromise) Constitution was 
exactly that. Gone was any pretension to a unified state, but instead two 
states in a kind of loose confederation with a common ruler and shared 
ministries for common finances, foreign affairs, and war. Both halves of the 
monarchy paid into a common budget, the Quota, but wildly 
disproportionately in Hungary’s favor. State debts that were accumulated 
to the benefit of both Austria and Hungary under the prior system were 
made more or less the exclusive burden of Austrian finances.  
The political logic of the post-1867 Austro-Hungarian order prevented 
the creation of effective political institutions that could effectively manage 
the problems the state faced, for fear of instability that could break the 
fragile whole. Instead of building itself up, as unified Prussian Germany 
succeeded in doing after 1871, it was cleaved into two unequal halves. 
Austria, ruled from Vienna, was able to build domestic institutions that 
                                               
68 For an excellent overview of the Ausgleich constitution see Seton-Watson, "The Austro-
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could encourage a high degree of political and economic development, 
though inequality between the national groups was a constant source of 
tension.69 The Hungarian half was ruled by elites obsessed with 
“Magyarization,” constant assertion of the proclaimed legal, political, and 
cultural superiority of Hungarian as the lingua franca within their borders, to 
the detriment of the half of their population that did not consider 
themselves Hungarian. Magyarization discouraged the teaching of non-
Hungarian languages in schools, as reflected in the literacy rate. In 1910, 
Hungary reported that around twenty-eight percent of the population was 
illiterate, compared to sixteen percent in the Austrian half. In another 
multiethnic state, Belgium, only thirteen percent were illiterate.70 Domestic 
political development occurred in Hungary, though not nearly as deeply as 
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in the Austrian portion, partially due to Magyarization’s obsessive drive for 
uniformity.71 
Those institutions within Habsburg Austria that could have provided 
effective domestic governance were also divided along ethnic, religious, 
and political lines. The scenes that Mark Twain famously described in 
“Stirring Times in Austria” were caused by only a small minority of German 
anti-Clerical Liberals from Bohemia.72 The 1875 Reichsrat standing orders 
allowed a small minority of lawmakers to hold proceedings hostage with 
only a few votes. Of the 425 members of the Abgeordnetenhaus, only fifty 
were required to demand a roll-call vote on almost any matter that could 
last hours, only twenty for an emergency debate.73 It was all too easy to 
block further proceedings for days, entangling parliament in a procedural 
morass. Minority parties within particular ethic groups sought to outflank 
their majorities by exacerbating ethnic conflict and blocking, as in the case 
of Otto Lecher, compromise legislation that promised to improve the 
relative equality between ethnic groups.74  
                                               
71 See, e.g.: Gary Cohen, "Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society 
in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914," Central European History 40, no. 2 (2007). 
72 Lothar Höbelt, "Parliamentary Politics in a Multinational Setting: Late Imperial Austria," 
Center for Austrian Studies Working Papers Series (1992). 
73 Ibid., p. 6. 
74 Ibid., pp. 9 and 14-15. 
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The appalling position of Jews in Austro-Hungarian political life served 
to provide a kind of cohesion to the political system. Their “function” as an 
“other” allowed non-Jews to portray them as something to be guarded 
against and compete on the basis of making the strongest appeals to 
antisemitism. Even where Jews were marginally accepted as leaders of the 
Socialist Party, their acceptance was contingent on hiding their 
Jewishness.75 Efforts at “integration” into the German-Catholic social world 
were exemplified by the character of Dr. Goldenthal in Dr. Bernhardi: 
despite conversion to Christianity, choosing to have your children 
educated at Jesuit schools, etc. converted Jews could never pass the 
impossible tests of the German nationalist anti-Semites.76 Austrian Jews 
would always remain damned to second or third class status. 
Finally, efforts to reform the bureaucracy, for example the 
aforementioned Czech language reform, were constantly blocked by 
Lecher and others. Where it was possible for governments to carry reforms 
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through, those reforms were only possible in conjunction with “pork-barrel” 
politics: the significant infrastructure investments of Prime Minister Ernest 
von Koerber’s 1902 “Koerber Plan” were tied to future votes on 
administrative and constitutional reform.77 It should come as no surprise 
that the infrastructure projects passed easily, the political reforms not at 
all.       
In sum, Austria-Hungary’s bifurcated structure made internal 
governance difficult under the most ideal of circumstances. Religious, 
ethnic, and ideological cleavages divided the public, while extremist 
minorities sought to outflank their opponents, worsening polarization 
among political elites and the public. In the Austrian half of the empire, 
domestic institutions were weak, resistant to reform, and often deadlocked 
by ethnic conflict. In Hungary, domestic institutions had the additional 
challenge of being subverted to the larger goal of asserting Magyar ethnic 
and cultural superiority, which hindered economic and political 
development, and inflamed ethnic division.  
 
 
 
                                               
77 Deak, Forging a Multinational State, pp. 237-240, Höbelt, pp. 7-9, and Alexander 
Gerschenkron, An Economic Spurt that Failed: Four Lectures in Austrian History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 33-36. 
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The Politics of Development and the Politics of Backwardness 
In the previous section, I set out to explain how the domestic structure 
of the post-1867 Austro-Hungarian state contributed to the regime’s 
inability to build effective state institutions. Austria-Hungary’s weak internal 
structure also had significant economic effects, as it prevented a 
coordinated approach to industrialization and deep economic integration. 
Instead, the Austro-Hungarian economic relationship was one sided to the 
benefit of Hungarian landowners, who were more concerned with 
maintaining their social status than in achieving broad based economic 
development. In the Austrian half alone, industrialization did occur, though 
the Austrian lands never completely closed the gap with Prussian Germany 
or the rest of Western Europe. Just as with the examples of domestic 
political life, however, the tale of industrialization and economic 
development in Austria-Hungary is the tale of two different economies. 
One developing industrial economy that could compete on the European 
stage, and one that instead remained backward as the result of intentional 
policy choices.  
Theories of industrialization are tightly linked to theories of 
modernization and state-making, perhaps none more so than Alexander 
Gerschenkron’s 1962 book Economic Backwardness in Historical 
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Perspective.78 Gerschenkron sought to explain how industrialization 
worked across Europe during the nineteenth century, accounting for a 
wide variety of cases and political contexts. Gerschenkron’s argument 
turned on the idea of an economic “spurt,” a sudden burst of significant 
and extended economic growth. The longer a country waited to 
industrialize and the more backward it was, the more significant this spurt 
would be as evermore advanced technologies are introduced into a 
backward economy.79 Similarly, the later industrialization began, the more 
likely it was to require state direction or intervention. Finally, the abolition of 
serfdom, for example in Austria (1781), Hungary (1848), and Russia (1861), 
along with more efficient and less labor-intensive agricultural practices 
provided a potential industrial workforce.80  
The long gap between the abolition of serfdom in the Austrian half of 
the monarchy and the Hungarian half speaks volumes about the different 
economic and political contexts in which Austro-Hungarian industrialization 
took place. The first signs of industrialization in Austria begin to emerge as 
                                               
78 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962). 
79 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, p. 44. Gerschenkron 
often compares the idea of an industrializing spurt to modernization theorist Walt 
Rostow’s idea of a “take-off.” See: Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory 
in Cold War America, pp. 190-204. 
80 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, p. 8. 
 
 46 
early as the 1820s.81 From 1830 to 1913, total industrial production 
increased an average of between 2.8% and 3% per year.82 Gerschenkron 
is right to point out that a spurt could have been beneficial to the overall 
economic development of the Austrian half of the empire, and could have 
helped close the widening gap with the unified German Empire that 
emerged in the later nineteenth century.83 However, industrialization had 
long been underway. 
Austrian industrialization was stunted by Hungarian demands for tariffs 
that would protect Hungarian agricultural production (and Hungarian 
landowners) from external competition. This had a number of important 
effects, all of which hampered industrialization. First, the Austrian domestic 
market was held captive to Hungarian landowners, and the Viennese 
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working class paid more for food than the working classes of London or 
Hamburg.84 Second, retaliatory tariffs from key trading partners, for 
example the agricultural exporters of the Balkans, closed those markets to 
Austrian high value-added industrial and consumer goods.85 A case in 
point: in 1884, 44% of Romania’s total imports came from Austria-
Hungary, while only 15% came from Germany. In 1894, this figure stood at 
27% for Austria-Hungary and 28% for Germany. In 1910, 24% and 34% 
for Germany.86 In terms of the value of goods traded in Europe, Austria had 
fallen from 4th to a distant 6th, ahead of only Italy.87 From 1884 to 1913, 
Austrian goods made up an average of 82.9% of the value of all Austro-
Hungarian exports, which demonstrates the continued gulf between 
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Austrian and Hungarian industrial production.88 Finally, by closing the large 
Austrian market to the agricultural exports of key Balkan states, Austria 
unnecessarily antagonized those newly independent Balkan states, who 
began to deepen their ties with France, Russia, and Germany, losing the 
considerable political leverage it previously commanded.89  
If Hungary proved a net-negative for overall economic development and 
industrialization in Austria, the opposite was true in Hungary itself: it 
benefited enormously from holding the Austrian agricultural market captive, 
but also from unrestrained flows of capital from Austrian banks at favorable 
rates. As serfdom was eliminated only in 1848, grudging improvements in 
agricultural techniques and increased mechanization would eventually 
create a large pool of potential industrial workers, though the productivity 
and output gains of mechanization would be realized only slowly.90 Where 
industrialization did succeed and where Hungary enjoyed a comparative 
advantage vis-a-vis Austria was in food processing: the introduction of 
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steam powered flour mills would establish food processing as a key 
Hungarian industry for decades to come.91  
Hungary’s demand for ever higher agricultural tariffs in the years 
following the 1867 Ausgleich reflects both the limited nature of Hungarian 
industry and the damage these tariffs did to total Austro-Hungarian 
economic growth. Prior to the introduction of the most punishing tariffs 
1880, the average profit margin for a flour mill in Budapest was 26.2%, 
with an export volume (to Austria and outside the monarchy) of around 
250,000 tons, with approximately 110,000 tons entering the European 
market.92 In 1896, profits were still a healthy 7-10% and export volume had 
risen to 718,900 tons per year, but exports outside the monarchy 
increased only 8,800 tons, while 600,100 tons were exported to Austria, a 
growth rate of 413.5% and 8%, respectively.93 By 1913, Hungarian 
exported 779,300 tons of flour to Austria and only 34,000 tons to the rest 
of Europe. At the same time, the average price of wheat in Austria was on 
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average, considerably higher than in other major European cities. In 1880, 
the price of around 12kg of wheat flour in London was 24.5 Austrian 
Kronen (k) and in Vienna, k26.8. In 1892, k16.8 and k19.4 in London and 
Vienna, respectively. And in 1899, k14.5 in London while Austrians paid 
k20.1.94 Austrian agricultural prices were on average much higher than the 
rest of Europe, held captive to Hungarian demands for ever higher 
agricultural tariffs.95 
In sum, the Austro-Hungarian economy was a tale of two separate 
economies. The Austrian economy began industrializing shortly after the 
Battle of Waterloo, as landless peasants, long freed from the obligations of 
serfdom and military conscription migrated at ever higher rates to urban 
centers, creating a pool of potential labor. Hungary, however, maintained 
traditional serf-peasant obligations through the first half of the nineteenth-
century and was held captive by a powerful alliance of landed gentry and 
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conservative politicians who sought to defend their positions and 
economic power through high tariffs and rents.96 Only when the benefits of 
industrialization were plainly apparent and, as Gerschenkron suggests, the 
relative backwardness to Austria became so pronounced, did they engage 
in grudging state-led efforts to industrialize in the late 1890s and early 
1900s.97  
The history of Austro-Hungarian economic policy and the development 
of Austro-Hungarian state institutions demonstrate the divergent paths 
each half of the monarchy took. In the first case, efforts to reform the state, 
create an effective administrative infrastructure, and end serfdom all 
succeeded in the Austrian half. In the Hungarian half, the drive for reforms 
and administrative reforms that that had proven themselves so successful 
in the Austrian half were fiercely resisted, as was the implementation of the 
1781 decree ending serfdom.98 In Hungary, the elimination of serfdom only 
followed after the military occupation of Kingdom by Austrian forces in 
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1849.99 Underdevelopment, in Hungary at least, was an active choice made 
by Hungarian elites.100 It was Hungarian elites who pursued a policy of 
Magyarization, who declined to embrace widespread basic education, and 
who repudiated Austrian bank investments in infrastructure that could have 
created “spurt” conditions sooner, rather than much later.101 
From a purely economic perspective, the Austro-Hungarian Union left 
Austria worse off. For Austria, basic staples cost more while their ability to 
export their high value-added products was hindered by the retaliatory 
tariffs against those tariffs demanded by Hungarian agricultural interests. 
Had those tariffs not existed, competition for agricultural commodities 
could have lowered the prices paid by the developing industrial working 
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class, boosted overall Austrian exports, and maintained positive relations 
with the Balkan states who turned against Austria after the tariffs came into 
effect. 
 
International Crisis and the Decision for War in 1914 
On 28 July 1914 the Austro-Hungarian newspaper of record, the Wiener 
Zeitung, published a declaration entitled “To My Peoples!,” detailing 
Emperor Franz Josef’s decision to declare war on Serbia. Austria-Hungary 
arrived at this point not only as the result of its declining international 
prestige, but as a result of its failures to build a cohesive state that could 
administer and unify the “peoples” ruled by Franz Josef. Furthermore, 
because of this state’s domestic challenges and bifurcated governance, 
efforts to build influence and political relationships through strong bilateral 
trade, especially in the Balkans, was often hampered by domestic 
challenges, especially internal conflicts over trade policy. When Franz 
Josef and his advisors made the positive decision to launch a war, it was 
as much an attempt to resolve internal challenges as it was to address 
Austria-Hungary’s precipitous decline as a great power or a response to 
the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand. 
The two previous sections in this chapter outlined Austria-Hungary’s 
domestic and economic challenges in the years before the First World War. 
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This section integrates the findings of those previous sections with the 
historical analysis of the international challenges of the same period. Taken 
together, these challenges would prove overwhelming. Austria-Hungary 
failed to engage in cohesive state-making after 1867 because the logic of 
the bifurcated constitutional system made it more difficult—though not 
impossible—to solve the monarchy’s problems through centralization and 
cohesive state-making. With the particular interests of a tiny elite driving 
economic policy, the implementation of policies that could have promoted 
economic development across the whole of the empire were continuously 
blocked. Social challenges like illiteracy remained more widespread than in 
other comparable states, which no doubt also inhibited economic 
development and overall economic growth.102 Taken with the effect of 
Magyarization policies that for a large part of the empire proved 
antagonistic and which actively promoted division and ethnic tension, 
there was little chance for the kind of state-making that would allow the 
Austro-Hungarian state to manage these challenges.103 
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The economic effects of this disunity were considerable and directly 
linked to Austria-Hungary’s worsening international position. Instead of 
seeking to compete on the European market on the basis of price and 
quality or modernizing their cultivation methods and equipment, Hungarian 
landowners used their political power to erect both tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to protect their domestic markets.104 Punishingly high tariffs 
effectively blocked grain imports from the Balkan states, severely 
damaging political and economic relations. For Hungarian producers, it 
made no difference if their grain and refined products (e.g. flour) went to 
Serbia or Salzburg. But for Austrian industrial equipment or textile 
manufacturers, it made a significant difference, as they were shut out of 
important markets and lost considerable market share even where they still 
had access.105  
Losing market share and denying market access to Balkan producers in 
the Austro-Hungarian domestic market meant that they also lost political 
influence with the same. In the case of Serbia, the trade war that raged 
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from 1906 to 1911 coincided with the crisis over the Austro-Hungarian 
decision to formally annex Bosnia in 1907/1908. Never mind the fact that 
the annexation was long foreseen by the other European great power 
statesmen and that Bosnia’s protectorate status made it a province of 
Austria-Hungary in all but name.106 The strained relationship between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia due to the trade war taken together with 
Austria’s decision to formally annex Bosnia provided Russia the perfect 
opportunity to encourage South Slav nationalism throughout the Balkans 
and within the South Slav territories of Austria-Hungary itself.107  
The significant domestic and economic challenges described above 
were only compounded by the changing norms of relations between 
European states in European (for lack of a better word, “Continental”) 
affairs and the introduction of an “imperialist ethos” which supplanted the 
post-1815 Congress of Vienna equilibrium. Outside of the European 
continent, the “imperial scramble” was the search for territories to conquer, 
regardless of their economic or social value to the colonizing nation, in 
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order that other European powers be prevented from obtaining whatever 
sliver of land they had won.108 Within Europe, this attitude encouraged 
some powers to seek advantage at all costs, no matter what damage it 
might cause to the overall equilibrium of power within the continent.109 
Russian efforts to inflame ethnic tensions in the Balkans during and after 
Austria’s formal annexation of Bosnia—despite their earlier 
acknowledgement and support of the de facto legality of the annexation—
are indicative of this imperialist attitude.110  
Austria-Hungary was uniquely unprepared to act as an imperial power 
within Europe or without, as it held no colonies and did not participate in 
the “scramble for Africa.” Instead of trying to use imperialist tactics in the 
                                               
108 This is of course to say nothing of the devastation wrought on the inhabitants of these 
colonized territories. The case of the genocide in German Southwest Africa being a 
particularly painful example. See: Jürgen Zimmerer, "Annihlation in Africa: The “Race War” 
in German Southwest Africa (1904-1908) and its Significance for a Global History of 
Genocide," Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Washington 37 (2005). 
109 Paul W. Schroeder, "The Life and Death of a Long Peace, 1763-1914," in The Waning 
of Major War: Theories and Debates, ed. Raimo Väyrynen (New York: Routledge, 2006), 
pp. 50-53, "Stealing Horses to Great Applause: Austria-Hungary’s Decision in 1914 in 
Systemic Perspective," pp. 34-37, and Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: 
Global Empires and Revolutions, 1890-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), pp. 83-92. 
110 Schroeder, “Stealing Horses,” ibid. 
 
Other examples cited by Schroeder include the Italian attack on the Ottoman Empire in 
Libya and the Russian supported Serb-Bulgarian-Greek alliance against the Ottomans, 
both having significant and destabilizing consequences for the stability of continental 
Europe. 
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Balkans as the Russians had done, they sought to reestablish the trade 
relationships that had previously tied the Balkans to the Habsburg state to 
great effect. To this end, Austro-Hungarian banks extended cheap credit 
and manufacturers were incentivized to lower their prices for Balkan 
markets.111 However, these policies ultimately had little effect, partially 
because Balkan importers had long since established deep trading 
relationships with other nations on equally or more favorable terms, 
partially because Austro-Hungarian agricultural import tariffs remained 
high, and partially because of Austria’s support of the Ottoman Empire 
during the First Balkan War in the interests of European stability and 
equilibrium.112  
In Chapter II, the analysis of the process of state-making primarily 
hinged on the creation of an effective and professional military force that 
was capable of exerting a monopoly of violent force across the territories 
claimed by the Habsburg Emperor. This chapter has attempted to 
demonstrate how post-1815 European state-making also involves the 
creation of a domestic political system that can effectively administer the 
                                               
111 Serbia was of course excluded as the aforementioned tariff war continued until 1911. 
112 Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913, pp. 130-142 and Preshlenova, "Austro-Hungarian 
Trade and the Economic Development of Southeastern Europe Before World War I," p. 
249-253. 
 
There was also a lack of suitable transport links between Austria-Hungary and the 
Balkans, a fact that would emerge as a significant challenge during World War I. 
 59 
state and a competitive industrializing economy. Unfortunately for Austria-
Hungary, neither of these two elements can be said to have existed in their 
ideal form. And their absence makes the “classical” element of state-
making, an effective army, almost possible to achieve, at least on paper. In 
both qualitative and quantitative measures, the Austro-Hungarian Army 
was poorly equipped and unable to meet the challenges that a general war 
would bring. As the administration of the army was a matter of joint 
concern, it was just another pressure point through which the Hungarian 
government could demand concessions from the Emperor and from the 
Austrian government. Only the Bosnian crisis of 1908 and the Balkan Wars 
of 1912-1913 would convince the Hungarians of the urgent need for reform 
and improvement and even then, total military expenditure was still 
considerably lower than the nearest similar sized power. At the same time, 
the Balkan powers who had been spurned economically and politically had 
begun to invest considerably more than in previous years.113 The lack of 
investment puts this problem very plain: at the end of 1910, Austria-
Hungary had a population of 51,306,620 and expended £21,060,797 on 
defense. At the same time, Metropolitan France had a population of 
                                               
113 David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 199-210. 
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39,601,509 and expended £34,574,847. Put another way, Austria-Hungary 
spent £0.41 per person and France spent more than double with £0.87.114  
The combination of a dysfunctional administrative state, relatively weak 
economy, and under equipped, poorly trained military left Austria-Hungary 
in a weak and worsening position in 1914. On top of these challenges, 
Austria-Hungary faced a worsening international environment, driven by 
the “new imperialism,” in which it was unable to compete. Making the 
decision for war in 1914, with the earnest and not totally unreasonable 
hope that it will remain a local conflict, does not seem to be a wholly 
unreasonable decision. It might even have been a consideration in the 
minds of some decision makers that war could have provided the catalyst 
for state-making, just as was the case in 1618.   
                                               
114 The expenditure data is compiled using 1911 exchange rates in Hermann, The Arming 
of Europe, pp. 236-237. The population figures come from the figures compiled by the 
Austrian Statistical Office and published in: Kaiserlich-Königliche Statistiche 
Zentralkomission, "Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910," 
Österreichische Statistik 1, no. 1 (1912): p. 39.  
Chapter 4 
Conclusion: Das Kaiserliche und Königliche Ministerium für 
Administrative Angelegenheiten 
All in all, how many remarkable things might be said about that vanished Kakania! For 
instance, it was kaiserlich-königlich (Imperial-Royal) and it was kaiserlich und königlich 
(Imperial and Royal); one of the two abbreviations, k.k. or k. k., applied to every thing and 
person, but esoteric lore was nevertheless required in order to be sure of distinguishing 
which institutions and persons were to be referred to as k.k. and which as k. k. On paper it 
called itself the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; in speaking, however, one referred to it as 
Austria, that is to say, it was known by a name that it had, as a State, solemnly renounced 
by oath, while preserving it in all matters of sentiment, as a sign that feelings are just as 
important as constitutional law and that regulations are not the really serious thing in life.

--Robert Musil, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften [The Man Without Qualities]  115
 In 1618, the Habsburg Monarchy found itself in an existential crisis. 
Long a collection of territories held together by the patrimonial rights of the 
Habsburg family, Protestant Czech nobles began to rebel for fear of losing 
their medieval privileges to check the power of the monarch. The Holy 
Roman Empire, the loose confederation of German speaking territories 
which the Habsburgs had dominated since 1440, found itself on the verge 
of dissolution over the issue of religion. This crisis would continue for the 
next thirty years in the form of a brutal, grinding slog of a war.

The outbreak of this war would result in the creation of a professional 
army that was, for the first time, directly accountable to the emperor whose 
territory it ostensibly represented. This army wore uniforms that were 
standardized and mass produced, and it was mostly financed through a 
tax system that was more eﬃcient than any of its contemporary 
 This translation is from: The Man Without Qualities (New York: Vintage International, 115
1996), translated by Sophie Wilkins, p. 29.
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standardized and mass produced, and it was mostly financed through a 
tax system that was more efficient than any of its contemporary 
Continental peers. And while historians may debate the outcome of the 
Thirty Years War and its meaning for the Habsburg Monarchy, these 
innovations ensured its survival after its close brush with extinction in 
1618. The Habsburg Monarchy had engaged in the process of state-
making: the creation of institutions and financial mechanisms to ensure the 
sovereignty of the territory they ruled.  
However, the development of Habsburg Austria after 1648 did not 
ultimately result in a state that was able to strengthen and unite itself, as it 
did in the seventeenth century. By 1867, after multiple devastating military 
defeats, the Habsburg Monarchy found itself in a precarious position. 
Attempting to create a unified monarchy, Emperor Franz Josef was forced 
to agree to the bifurcation of his lands into a western Austrian half and an 
eastern Hungarian half. Domestic political challenges, for example the lack 
of a common national language and the use and recognition of minority 
languages, served only to polarize both the Austrian parliament and society 
generally. The two halves had different economic policy needs: the 
Austrian half had an export economy with high value added industrial 
products, and the Hungarian half had an agrarian economy dominated by 
large landowners. Punishing tariffs, introduced to protect Hungarian 
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agriculture, cut Austrian exports off from key markets, as retaliatory tariffs 
were erected in response.  
 
In both periods, domestic and international magnified the effects of the 
other. Protestant nobles who feared the loss of their privileges turned to 
other Protestants outside of Habsburg Austria for assistance. Eventually 
another German monarch, the Protestant Friedrich V, served as King of 
Bohemia until it was successfully reclaimed by the Habsburgs in 1620. 
During the second period, the agricultural tariffs demanded by Hungarian 
landlords cut Austria-Hungary off from key Balkan allies, many of whom 
subsequently allied themselves politically and militarily against Austria-
Hungary.  
These periods both feature the transformation of the rules governing 
the international system. In the first case, the Protestant Reformation 
Domestic 
Challenges
International 
Challenges
Actions Taken Outcomes
1618-1648
Powers to raise taxes, 
create army blocked 
by noble estates in 
revolt; core parts of 
Empire declare 
independence. 
Thirty Years War; 
invasion by Protestant 
armies; potential 
destruction of Holy 
Roman Empire.
Taxation with limited 
noble approval and 
reformed tax collection; 
deepened alliance with 
Bavaria and Habsburg 
Spain; establishment of 
professional army.
More eﬃcient taxation 
system; permanent 
standing army; survival 
of Holy Roman Empire; 
formal conclusion of 
war in 1648.
1867-1914
Widespread ethnic 
unrest; parliament 
unable to govern; 
division into two 
halves worsened 
governance.
Long series of 
significant military 
defeats prior to 1867; 
economic policy 
alienated former allies; 
changing rules of 
diplomacy within 
European aﬀairs.
Formal annexation of 
Bosnia; Koerber Plan 
for infrastructure; 
reform of language 
laws.
Annexation inflamed 
tensions in Balkans; 
Koerber Plan largely 
abandoned; 
polarization within 
parliament worsened 
by language law 
debate.
Table 4.1: Comparison of Domestic and International Challenges, Actions Taken, and Outcomes
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resulted in the end of an international system that was united by a single 
religion, Catholicism, and its replacement with the notion of sovereignty, 
which demanded the creation of state institutions that could defend a 
ruler’s claim to sovereignty. Sovereignty is the principal that a ruler or 
government is the “master at home and an equal abroad.” It demanded 
that a sovereign hold the exclusive claim to the use of violence as a means 
for coercion within that territory. As discussed in chapter 2, the Czech 
Protestant revolt was an example of a challenge to the sovereign authority 
of the Habsburg Monarchy. In the waning years of Habsburg Austria-
Hungary, European continental affairs was driven by the “new imperialism” 
which encouraged European states to conquer territory simply to prevent 
other states from doing the same. Embracing this philosophy in 1907-
1908, Austria-Hungary annexed its Bosnian protectorate, setting off an 
international crisis.  
What distinguishes the two periods from one another is their outcome: 
in the first instance, the Habsburgs are able to engage in the process of 
state-making, creating an army and creating taxes with which to pay for it. 
In the second case, however, they were prevented from state-making as a 
result of a combination of international and domestic factors that had 
gradually narrowed their scope of action and weakened the cohesion of 
their state. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914 was not 
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simply the latest in a series of international political defeats, but a 
challenge to the Habsburg Monarchy’s sovereignty and the viability of the 
Austro-Hungarian state. A challenge, of course, that it would not 
overcome, and a tragedy for the fifty-two million Austro-Hungarians who 
suffered the hardship and death of World War I.  
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